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This paper examines the relationship between political equality and quality of gov-
ernment. Our hypothesis is that political equality fosters access to inclusive educa-
tion and ultimately promotes good governance. We empirically test this hypothesis
using data for 145 countries with different levels of economic development. In order
to overcome potential endogeneity problems, our identification strategy exploits the
variation in political equality in geographically neighbouring countries by means of
spatial econometric techniques. The results reveal a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect of political equality on the quality of government. This implies that
countries where the political power is more evenly distributed tend on average to
have higher levels of institutional quality. In fact, this result is not affected by the
inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of controls that may be correlated
with both political equality and quality of government, including the level of demo-
cracy and the degree of economic inequality. In fact, the observed link between
political equality and governance remains robust to alternative measures of quality
of government, estimation techniques, and other sensitivity checks. Our estimates
also show that education acts as a transmission channel linking political equality
and quality of government.
Keywords: political equality, quality of government, education.
JEL classification: H11, P48.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades a vast literature has shown the relevance of the quality of gov-
ernment for economic growth and long-run development (e.g. North, 1981; Knack and
Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004).
The quality of government is important because it shapes the incentives of key economic
actors in society; in particular, good governance has a positive impact on the investment
in physical and human capital and technology, contributes to attracting FDI, promotes a
more efficient division of labour and facilitates the implementation of policies designed to
reduce economic inequality and poverty (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Quibria, 2006). Indeed,
from the 1990s onwards the quality of government of recipient countries has increasingly
become an important objective for the international development aid (Dijkstra, 2018).
Furthermore, the quality of life is higher in countries with better governance outcomes
(Bjøornskov et al., 2010; Helliwell et al., 2018). Accordingly, it is crucial to investigate
why some countries have better quality of government than others.
During the last years numerous scholars have examined the effects of different factors
on the quality of government, including geographical and historical conditions, cultural
characteristics, or economic variables such as the degree of trade openness, economic
inequality, or the level of development itself (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Al-Marhubi, 2004;
Treisman, 2007). Against this background, various contributions have considered the
impact of democracy on the promotion of good governance (e.g. Charron and Lapuente,
2010; Fortunato and Panizza, 2015; Kotschy and Sunde, 2017), although there is limited
evidence that, by itself, the extension of democratic liberties fosters improvements in
government performance. However, as far as we are aware, this empirical literature has
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paid no attention so far to the possible effect of the degree of concentration of political
power across income groups on the quality of government, thus ignoring the role played
by political equality in this context. This omission is potentially important given that
democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts (Houle, 2018).
In fact, our empirical analysis shows that there is a substantial cross-country variation
in political equality, even conditional on the same level of democracy. At the same time,
as we will see below, there are theoretical arguments to assume that the distribution of
political power across income groups should affect the way in which authority is exercised
by governments.
In order to fill this gap and extend the literature on the determinants of good gov-
ernance, the present paper aims to examine the relationship between political equality
and quality of government using data for 145 countries with different levels of economic
development. In particular, we are interested in finding out to what extent the dis-
tribution of political power across income groups contributes to shaping the quality of
government. More precisely, our hypothesis is that low levels of political equality are
detrimental to government performance. To shed light on the causal effect of polit-
ical equality on governance, our identification strategy exploits the variation in political
equality in geographically neighbouring countries by means of spatial econometric tech-
niques.
Our results reveal a positive and statistically significant effect of political equality
on the quality of government. This implies that countries where the political power
is more evenly distributed across income groups tend on average to have higher levels
of institutional quality, which is consistent with our theoretical framework. In fact,
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this result is not affected by the inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of
controls that may be correlated with both political equality and quality of government,
including the level of democracy and the degree of economic inequality. In fact, the
observed link between political equality and governance remains robust to alternative
measures of quality of government, estimation techniques, and other sensitivity checks.
Our estimates also show that education acts as a transmission channel linking political
equality and quality of government. Overall, these results are consistent with the work of
Acemoglu et al. (2007), who highlight the importance of political equality for long-run
development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 2
discusses from a theoretical perspective why political equality should affect the quality of
government. Section 3 describes the measures used in the paper to quantify the level of
political equality and quality of government in the various countries. Section 4 examines
empirically the existence of a relationship between the degree of concentration of political
power across income groups and governance outcomes. The potential endogeneity of
political equality in this context is addressed in section 5. In order to complement
our findings, section 6 explores the relevance of education as a transmission channel
linking political equality and quality of government. The final section offers the main
conclusions of the paper.
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2 Political equality, quality of government and education:
A theoretical framework
As we have mentioned in the introduction, the extensive empirical literature on the
determinants of the quality of government has paid no attention so far to the potential
effect of political equality on governance. Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume the
existence of a relationship between the degree of concentration of political power across
income groups and government performance. In particular, in this paper we focus our
attention on the role played by education as a potential transmission channel linking
political equality and quality of government.
In countries with relatively low levels of political equality, the ruling elite has incent-
ives to keep the status quo and may not be interested in a more educated population,
despite the growth-enhancing potential effect of human capital (Savoia et al., 2010). On
the contrary, in countries with relatively high levels of political equality, the middle and
lower classes can use their political power to promote educational policies and reforms
designed to increase the general education of the population, as a way to guarantee equal-
ity of opportunities for all citizens (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019). These arguments
suggest the existence of a positive relationship between political equality and education.
In fact, this association is supported by abundant historical evidence that shows that
political inequality may be detrimental to the emergence of efficient institutions and the
development of a quality education system due to the rent-seeking behaviour of polit-
ical and economic elites. For example, Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) point out that
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were historically characterized by high
levels of economic inequality because of their geographical characteristics, which led to
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oligarchic politics and extractive institutions designed to maintain the political power of
the elites and to preserve the existing inequality. This gave rise to low levels of political
equality and a restricted access to education for the general population (Galor et al.,
2009).1 This contrasts with the situation in North America, where geographic conditions
led to a more egalitarian distribution of political power and economic resources since the
beginning of the colonial period, thus favouring the development of growth-promoting
institutions. As a result, education levels in North America were considerably higher
than in the rest of the continent, to the point that it is likely that the United States
had the most literate population in the world by 1800 (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000,
p. 227). The historical examples on the relationship between political equality and
education are not limited to the preindustrial period. Thus, the advances in the process
of urbanization and the development of trade unions during the industrial revolution
brought about the emergence in different countries of Western Europe of politically
powerful middle classes who favoured educational policies and reforms that promoted
the education of the masses (Huber et al., 1993; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000).
Despite this historical evidence, to the best of our knowledge, none study has em-
pirically examined so far the link between political equality and education. However,
there are various contributions about the impact on human capital formation of land
inequality, which can be interpreted as a reasonable proxy for the degree of concentra-
tion of political power. Nevertheless, the results of these works are not conclusive. For
example, Eriksson and Vollrath (2004) find in a sample of developing and developed
countries that lower land inequality across agricultural populations, but not inequality
1This general picture is compatible with the existence of differences across countries (Coatsworth,
1998; Nugent and Robinson, 2002).
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within the landholding class, is associated with higher public provision of education.
Using historical data for the United States and several European countries, Galor et al.
(2009) and Baten and Hippe (2018) show that inequality in land distribution is negat-
ively correlated with the investment in education. These findings, however, contrasts
with those obtained by Gray and Clark (2014) and Gon˜i (2016), who reject the effect of
land inequality on human capital formation for England.
In turn, the level of education of the population may affect the quality of government.
According to the modernization theory popularized by Lipset (1959), education plays
a key role in empowering citizens to engage with government institutions. As pointed
out by Almond and Verba (1989 [1963], p. 316), “the uneducated man or the man
with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a
higher level of education.” At the same time, education is considered “the best proxy
for both information and civic virtues” (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, p. 8), and it can
contribute to promoting good governance by both fostering social capital and reducing
informational asymmetries. Indeed, citizens with high levels of education are more
likely to select good politicians and detect corrupted public officials, thus improving
the quality of government (Milligan et al., 2004; Ostrom, 2006). This is consistent
with the results obtained by Glaeser et al. (2004), who show that schooling is a strong
predictor of institutional improvement. In a similar vein, Fortunato and Panizza (2015)
find that education has a positive impact on the quality of government, although only
in consolidated democracies.
Taken together, the various arguments laid down above suggest the existence of a
positive association between political equality and quality of government. In particular,
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according to the previous discussion, we can formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The degree of political equality has a positive effect on the quality of
government.
Hypothesis 2: Education acts as a transmission channel linking political equality and
quality of government.
In the rest of the paper we aim to empirically test the validity of these hypotheses
using data for a cross-section of countries with different levels of economic development.
3 Data and preliminary evidence
Our research requires data on the degree of political equality in the various countries. To
that end, we resort to a measure taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset,
which captures the degree to which political power is distributed equally across income
groups. This measure of political equality is constructed using the information provided
by multiple country experts (typically scholars or professionals with deep knowledge of
a country and its political institutions), who code one or several countries according to
expertise (Coppedge et al., 2018a).2 The ratings provided by these country experts are
aggregated using a measurement model based on Bayesian item response theory (IRT)
modeling techniques, which take into account measurement error and a potential serious
source of bias, known as differential item functioning (DIF), related to the possibility
that experts could have different thresholds for their ratings. The measurement model
2See the Appendix for further details.
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produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval
scale (Coppedge et al., 2018b). As recommended by the authors of V-Dem project, we
use as the main measure of political equality in our study the point estimate coinciding
with the median value of this distribution. This is a continuous variable, with higher
values indicating greater political equality. For example, for the year 2010 it ranges from
-2.44 (Ukraine) to 2.77 (Bolivia), with a mean value of 0.44 and a standard deviation of
1.00.
Before continuing, it is important to examine to what extent political equality and
democracy are distinct concepts, as “a key characteristic of democracy is the continued
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political
equals” (Dahl, 1971, p. 1). In order to explore this issue, we investigate the link between
the measure of political equality just described and a widely used democracy index
drawn from the Polity IV project. Figure 1 shows the scatter plot for the two variables
using data for 2010. As can be observed, there is a positive association between political
equality and democracy, with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.52 (p-value = 0.000).
Nevertheless, the relationship is far from perfect and there are numerous exceptions.
Some autocratic regimes such as Belarus, Eritrea or Cuba, are characterized by a level
of political equality above the median. By contrast, the experiences of countries such as
Chile, Nicaragua or Macedonia, highlight that democracy can also be compatible with
the existence of relatively low levels of political equality.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
Likewise, one may suspect that the measure of political equality is really reflecting
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the degree of economic inequality within the various countries. Indeed, as detailed in
the Appendix, the V-Dem project takes this concern into account and country experts
are explicitly asked for focusing on political, not economic, inequality. Figure 2 provides
a graphical illustration on the relationship between the measure of political inequality
and the income Gini index, based on net incomes from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID). As shown, there is a negative association between political
equality and economic inequality, with a pairwise correlation coefficient of -0.35 (p-value
= 0.000). However, the scatter plot also reveals numerous exceptions, which is consistent
with the evidence provided by Houle (2018). For example, there are countries such as
Bolivia, Lesotho or Sri Lanka, with high economic inequality but a level of political
equality above the median. At the same time, the cases of Ukraine, Kazakhstan or
Kosovo illustrate that a relatively low level of economic inequality and a high degree of
concentration of political power across income groups can also go hand in hand. These
examples indicate that the measure of political equality is not simply capturing the
economic differences across members of society.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
In order to carry out our analysis, we also need information about the quality of
government in the different countries. With this aim, we rely on the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999). These indicators
capture various aspects of governance, including “(1) the process by which governments
are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for
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the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann
et al., 1999, p. 1). Bearing in mind the nature of our study, we follow the strategy
adopted among other by Bjørnskov et al. (2010) and Helliwell et al. (2018), and use
as our main measure of quality of government the average of four out of the six in-
dicators constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999): government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.3 These indicators are obtained using
an unobserved components methodology that aggregates the information provided by
numerous underlying variables taken from different data sources, including surveys of
households and firms, commercial information providers, public sector organizations,
and non-governmental organizations. The method employed to calculate these six in-
dicators gives them a unit normal distribution ranging approximately from -2.5 to 2.5,
with higher values indicating better quality of government.4 The employment of an
aggregate indicator based on the average of the four WGI measures mentioned above
seems particularly appropriate in this context, as each individual index may suffer a
degree of measurement error.
In this paper we are interested in examining the link between political equality and
quality of government. As a first insight into this relationship, countries are divided
into two and three groups according to their degree of political equality in 2010. The
definitions of the various groups are based on the median (classification into two groups)
and the first and third quartiles (classification into three groups) of the cross-country
distribution of the measure of political equality. As can be seen in Figure 3, the countries
3The definitions of these four indicators are included in the Appendix. The main results of the paper
remain unaltered if we consider the average of the six WGI measures, including additionally the indices
of voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence. See section 4.3 for further
details.
4See Kaufmann et al. (2010) for further technical details.
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with higher levels of political equality tend on average to have better quality of govern-
ment. By contrast, those countries with worse governance outcomes are characterized
as a whole by a greater concentration of political power across income groups. Indeed,
the differences between the various groups are statistically significant at the 1% level,
as shown by the corresponding F-tests.
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
When considering these findings, however, it is important to note that this analysis
is merely descriptive, and the results just discussed may ultimately be sensitive to the
specific number of groups used to perform the country classification. More importantly,
it is very likely that the quality of government does not depend exclusively on the
degree of political equality. Accordingly, the information provided by Figure 3 should be
cautiously interpreted, because omitted variables may affect the apparent link between
political equality and governance outcomes. In view of this, in the next sections we
develop a more appropriate statistical analysis to investigate to what extent the degree
of political equality affects the quality of government.
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4 Is there a link between political equality and quality of
government?
4.1 The model
In order to examine in greater detail the relationship between political equality and
quality of government, we consider the following cross-sectional model:
QGi = α+ βPEi + γDEMi + δEIi + θXi + λr + εi (1)
where QGi, PEi, DEMi and EIi are respectively the values in country i of the meas-
ures of quality of government, political equality, democracy and economic inequality
described in section 3; Xi is a set of variables controlling for additional factors assumed
to influence governance; λr are regional fixed effects based on the World Bank classi-
fication; and εi is an heteroskedastic error term. This type of cross-sectional model is
widely used in the literature on the determinants of the quality of government (e.g. La
Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000, 2007; Al-Marhubi, 2004). The coefficient of interest
throughout the paper is β, which captures the effect of political equality on the qual-
ity of government. We include in the list of regressors the measures of democracy and
economic inequality because they are potential determinants of governance (e.g. Sunde
et al., 2008; Fortunato and Panizza, 2015; Kotschy and Sunde, 2017), and, according
to the previous discussion, they are also correlated with the degree of concentration of
political power across income groups (Figures 1 and 2). Consequently, the inclusion of
these variables in model (1) is particularly important in order to estimate the impact
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of political equality on the quality of government independently of the effect of these
covariates.
The control variables in Xi have been selected on the basis of existing studies on
the determinants of governance. Following the insights by La Porta et al. (1999, 2008),
we begin by including legal origin dummies in order to account for any potential effect
of legal codes on government performance.5 We also consider the possible influence of
colonial legacies on contemporary political institutions. To that end, we use a dummy
variable to identify former European colonies. Furthermore, according to cultural the-
ories that emphasize the role played by religious traditions in determining cultural at-
titudes towards social hierarchy and authority, religion may be important in shaping
governance (Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998). Indeed, La Porta et al. (1999) provide
some evidence that predominantly Protestant countries tend to have better government
performance than either predominantly Catholic or Muslim countries. Therefore, we
include in the list of controls the share of population in each country that is Protestant,
Roman Catholic or Muslim.
We also regress our measure of quality of government on a number of geographical
characteristics. Thus, we consider the impact of absolute latitude, as temperate zones
tend to have warmer climates and more productive agricultures, which has historically
enabled them to develop their economies and their institutional frameworks (La Porta et
al., 1999). Likewise, the effectiveness of government policies may be related to country
size or the existence of a topographically uneven territory (Olsson and Hanson, 2011;
Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). In fact, geography may have contributed throughout
5The full definitions of all the control variables and their sources are presented in the Appendix.
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history to shaping the degree of concentration of political power (Engerman and Sokoloff,
2000; Batten and Hippe, 2017). In view of this, we additionally control for a country’s
area, its elevation and a measure of terrain roughness. Moreover, numerous studies show
that ethnolinguistic diversity can have a negative effect on the quality of government
(e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003). Accordingly, we follow
the standard approach in the literature and include in the list of regressors a traditional
index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which measures the probability that two indi-
viduals, randomly selected from a country’s population, will belong to different groups.
Nevertheless, fractionalization indices do not capture other aspects of ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity that may also be important for the quality of government. In particular,
there are reasons to assume that the degree of polarization may be more relevant in
this context than the level of fractionalization (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Desmet et al.,
2012). Accordingly, we also control for an index of ethnolinguistic polarization. This
index quantifies the extent to which the composition of a country’s population resembles
a perfectly polarized distribution, in which the national population is composed of two
ethnolinguistic groups of equal size.
According to the economic theory of institutions, the advances in the process of devel-
opment contribute to creating a demand for good government, increasing the premium
for better governance (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Al-Marhubi, 2004). As is usual
in the literature, we employ the level of GDP per capita as a proxy for the level of
economic development in the various countries.6 At the same time, in resource-rich
countries politicians may have incentives to undermine the quality of government in or-
6The inclusion of GDP per capita in model (1) is, however, controversial, as this variable may be a
proximate outcome of political equality (Acemoglu et al., 2007).
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der to be less constrained in the extraction of resource rents (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).
Consequently, our model also incorporates the natural resources contribution to GDP.
In turn, the opening of national borders to international markets may also be related to
government performance (Ezcurra, 2012). Moreover, in a globalized world contacts with
ideas and practices of other societies tend to generate social and cultural patterns that
may lead to improve governance (La Porta et al., 2008). In view of this, we include in
the list of regressors in model (1) a measure of the degree of integration of each country
with the rest of the world, which takes into account the economic, social and political
aspects of globalization.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows several summary statistics for the different controls
just described. In the econometric analysis below we use the mean value of the measure
of quality of government over the period 2011-2015 as our dependent variable, while all
time-varying regressors (including the index of political equality) enter in the model as
their respective means during the period 2005-2010 in order to minimize any potential
simultaneity bias.7
4.2 Baseline results
Table 1 presents the results obtained when various versions of model (1) are estimated
by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors using data for 145 countries.8
The different specifications work reasonably well in accounting for the cross-country
variation in governance, with relatively good values in terms of goodness-of-fit. Focusing
on the main aim of the paper, our estimates show that the coefficient of the measure of
7See section 5 for further details on this issue.
8The full list of countries is included in the Appendix.
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political equality is in all cases positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This
reveals that higher political equality is associated with better quality of government,
which is consistent with the first hypothesis formulated in section 2 and the preliminary
evidence provided by Figure 3. In fact, this result is not affected by the inclusion in the
analysis of the various controls described in subsection 4.1, confirming its robustness
and indicating that the observed link between political equality and governance is not
a spurious correlation resulting from the omission of these covariates. This is especially
relevant given that, as discussed above, several regressors included in our baseline model
may be correlated with both political equality and government performance (e.g. the
quality of democracy or the degree of economic inequality). The information provided
by Table 1 reveals that political equality contributes to explaining the cross-country
differences in governance, and is not simply capturing the effect of these variables. Figure
4 illustrates the observed link between political equality and quality of government with
a partial regression plot based on all covariates.
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE
The regression coefficient from our preferred specification in Table 1 (column 5)
reveals that raising the measure of political equality by one standard deviation is associ-
ated with an increase in the index of governance of around 0.11. To get a more accurate
idea of the magnitude of the effect of political equality on government performance, we
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consider the case of Botswana. Botswana is a country characterized by an intermedi-
ate degree of political equality (PE = 0.52), while its governance score is above the
sample median (QG = 0.68). Our estimates indicate that if Botswana had an index of
political equality equal to that registered for example by New Zealand (PE = 1.18), its
governance score would increase by around 12%. These figures suggest that political
equality has a quantitatively relevant impact on the quality of government.
When interpreting the results in Table 1, it is important to note that the robustness of
the coefficient estimates on the measure of political equality to the inclusion of additional
controls provides a first piece of evidence that omitted variables alone are not driven
the observed relationship between the degree of concentration of political power across
income groups and quality of government. However, although model (1) incorporates a
substantial set of controls, the possibility of some omitted variable bias remains. In order
to investigate the relevance of this potential problem, we now use the method proposed
by Oster (2017). Building on the earlier work of Altonji et al. (2005), this approach
employs the selection on the observed explanatory variables as a guide on the degree of
selection on unobserved variables. In particular, Oster (2017) uses coefficient stability
and R-squared movements when the various controls are introduced in the model to
assess whether the estimation results are robust to omitted variable bias. Following
Oster (2017), we calculate how important the degree of selection on unobserved variables
would have to be relative to observed variables in order to eliminate the observed effect
of political equality on the quality of government, under the strictest assumption that if
both observed and unobserved controls were included in the model the R-squared would
be one. In our analysis we compare the model with the full set of controls (column 5
in Table 1) with a restricted version which only includes as controls the measures of
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political equality, democracy and economic inequality, as well as regional fixed effects.
The results indicate that the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables
is 1.25. This implies that the unobservables would have to be more important than
observables in order to explain away the effect of political equality. Given that our choice
of controls is based on the findings of the literature on the determinants of governance
(see subsection 4.1), this result increases our confidence that the observed relationship
between political equality and the quality of government is not driven by unobserved
heterogeneity.
With respect to the various controls included in model (1), the results are in gen-
eral consistent with those obtained by other authors. Our estimates show that larger
countries exhibit inferior government performance. At the same time, the information
provided by Table 1 reveals that GDP per capita and the degree of integration with the
rest of the world are positively associated with the quality of government. Moreover,
there is some evidence that natural resources abundance exerts a negative effect on gov-
ernance outcomes. Finally, our findings also point to the existence of a positive link
between democracy and mean elevation and quality of government, while the impact of
the degree of ethnolinguistic polarization would be negative. Nevertheless, these results
should be treated with some caution because the coefficients of these covariates are not
statistically significant consistently across the various specifications included in Table 1.
4.3 Robustness checks
So far our analysis has revealed the existence of a positive and statistically significant
relationship between political equality and quality of government. In this subsection we
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explore the robustness of this finding.
Outliers and influential observations
As a first robustness test, we examine the potential impact of outliers and influential
observations on our estimates. To do so, we begin by calculating each country’s DF-
BETA statistic for the index of political equality, which is a measure of the difference in
the estimated coefficient for this variable (scaled by the estimated standard error of the
coefficient) when the country in question is included and when it is excluded from the
sample. According to the rule of thumb proposed by Belsley et al. (1980), we remove
from the analysis all countries for which |DFBETA| > 2/√n, where n is the sample
size. When this cut-off is applied, 13 countries are influential in the specification of
model (1) with the full set of controls (column 5 in Table 1). The first column in Table
2 shows that the coefficient of the measure of political equality continues to be positive
and statistically significant once these countries are dropped from the analysis. In order
to confirm this finding, we also use robust regression as an alternative way to identify
the possible influence of potential outliers (Berk, 1990). Column 2 of Table 2 reveals
that the observed link between the degree of concentration of political power across in-
come groups and quality of government still holds when this method is used to estimate
model (1).
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
We now investigate the impact on the results of the countries with the lowest and
highest levels of political equality and quality of government. To that end, we remove
19
from the sample those countries whose measures of political equality and governance are
below (above) the 10th (90th) percentile of the distribution of these variables. Columns
3-6 of Table 2 show that dropping these countries does not affect the observed association
between political equality and government performance. Furthermore, column 7 of Table
2 presents the results for an alternative subset of countries which excludes dictatorships,
defined as countries with an average Polity IV democracy score less than −5 over the
period 2005-2010. This may be important, as autocratic regimes tend to be generally
characterized by low levels of political equality and quality of government. Nevertheless,
the estimates reveal that our results are not driven by dictatorships.
Alternative measures of quality of government
The findings in Table 1 may also be sensitive to the choice of the measure employed to
quantify the quality of government in the various countries. For this reason, we begin
by exploring the effect on the results of employing an alternative aggregate measure of
governance based on the average of the six WGI indices (Easterly and Levine, 2003;
Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2017). We also examine whether our results hold for each
of the six WGI indices, which capture different aspects institutional quality. Next, we
employ an alternative indicator of quality of government equal to the average value
of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indices of corruption, law and order
and bureaucratic quality. We also use two measures of rule of law taken respectively
from the V-Dem project and Freedom House, as well as a corruption perception index
provided by Transparency International. Table 3 shows the results obtained when model
(1) is estimated again using these alternative measures of governance as dependent
variable. With the only exception of the index of regulatory quality, in all cases there
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is a positive and statistically significant association between political equality and the
various measures of quality of government, which reinforces the robustness of our results.
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
Alternative estimation strategies
As is usual in the literature on the determinants of quality of government, our analysis is
based on the estimation of a cross-sectional model (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman,
2000, 2007; Al-Marhubi, 2004; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). This is reasonable since
the levels of quality of government tend to be very persistent during the study period
and many of the controls included in vector X are time-invariant. Nevertheless, one may
exploit the panel dimension of the data in order to maximize the degrees of freedom,
thus reducing the collinearity among the regressors and improving the efficiency of the
estimates (Kelejian et al., 2013). For this reason, we now estimate model (1) using
pooled OLS with annual data for the period 1996-2015.9 As can be seen in Table 4, the
coefficient of the measure of political equality continues to be positive and statistically
significant when we use this alternative estimation strategy.
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE
9At this point, one may also consider the possibility of including country fixed effects. However,
controlling for country fixed effects is not appropriate in our case, as most of the variation experienced
by the key independent variable, the measure of political equality, is between countries rather than over
time. In fact, the information provided by an ANOVA model reveals that in our sample 91% of the
variation in the political equality data is due to variations across countries. As pointed out by Partridge
(2005, pp. 371-372), in this type of situation fixed effects models leave what is most important in the
data unexplained and may consequently produce inaccurate results.
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As pointed out in section 3, the Gini indices used to quantify the degree of economic
inequality within the various countries were taken from the SWIID. According to Solt
(2016), the SWIID allows one to maximize the comparability of available income in-
equality data for the greatest possible number of countries and years. Although this
dataset is not free of criticisms, “those pursuing research on income inequality across
many countries [. . .] will often find that the SWIID is their best choice of data source”
(Solt, 2015, p. 690). In order to minimize the gaps in the database, the SWIID employs
multiple imputation methods to recover missing values. Consequently, this dataset in-
cludes 100 Gini indices for each country-year. As is usual in the literature (e.g. Kotschy
and Sunde, 2017), our previous analyses use the mean Gini index for each country-year.
Nevertheless, Table 5 shows the results obtained when model (1) is estimated taking the
multiple imputation of the Gini indices into account. As can be seen, the relationship
between political equality and quality of government still holds, confirming once again
the robustness of our findings.
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
5 Endogeneity of political equality
When interpreting the earlier results, it is important to consider the possible endogeneity
of political equality in this context. As discussed above, the existence of measurement
error and omitted variable bias may affect our analysis. Moreover, political equality may
exert an effect on governance outcomes and, in turn, be affected by them, giving rise to
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a reverse causality problem. In the previous analysis we have addressed this issue using
lagged values of the measure of political equality to explain the variation in quality of
government. However, this may not be enough due to the high degree of persistence of
the measures of quality of government and political equality over the study period. In
view of this, we now deal with the potential endogeneity of political equality by means
of an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To do so, we need an appropriate instrument
for the degree of political equality, which must not be correlated with the error term in
model (1) but account for the cross-country differences in political equality.
Our IV strategy exploits the variation in political equality in geographically neigh-
bouring countries. Specifically, we use as instrument the weighted mean of the level
of political equality in geographically neighbouring countries. To calculate this mean,
the values of the measure of political equality are weighted by a spatial weights matrix,
W , which describes how the countries in the sample are spatially interconnected. In









if i 6= j
(2)
where dij is the great-circle distance between the capitals of countries i and j, which in
itself is strictly exogenous. As can be checked in expression (2), W is row standardized,
so that it is relative and not absolute distance which matters. The rationale for using
this instrument is based on the idea that the gradual spreading of values and norms
across countries influences on the citizens’ attitudes towards the way in which authority
is exercized by governments, thus shaping the demand for political equality (Klasing,
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2013; Beugelsdijk and Klasing, 2016). These spatial spillovers are more likely between
neighbouring countries, as they often share similar cultural and historical backgrounds,
and have close informational ties (Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Aidt and Jensen, 2014).
This suggests that the degree of political equality in a given country should be affected
by the levels of political equality in neighbouring countries. Our identification strategy
is similar to the approach adopted by several recent studies in which the strength of
democracy in neighbouring countries is used as instrument for democracy (e.g. Madsen
et al., 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2019; Krieger, 2019).
INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE
Figure 5 reveals the existence of a positive and strong link between domestic polit-
ical equality and the average of neighbouring countries. In fact, the instrument alone
explains around 22% of the cross-country variation in political equality. In order to
confirm the relevance of the instrument, we estimate the standard first stage regres-
sions. As can be observed in Table 6, the coefficient of the degree of political equality in
neighbouring countries is in all cases positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
regardless of the controls considered. Indeed, the first stage F-statistics for the excluded
instrument are in all regressions above the threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger and
Stock (1997) when there is a single endogenous regressor, thus confirming the strength
of the instrument.10
10As we discuss below in greater detail, the results of the first stage regressions in Table 6 should
be treated with caution because of the inclusion of the degree of political inequality in neighbouring
countries in the list of regressors leads to bias in OLS estimates. Nevertheless, the relevance of the
instrument remains unaltered if we address this problem using alternative estimation methods. See
Table A2 for further details.
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INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
To be a valid instrument, however, political equality in neighbouring countries should
not affect the quality of government in any given country, beyond its impact on the level
of political equality in the country in question. This exclusion restriction cannot be
formally tested in the absence of other instruments. Nevertheless, one may argue that
the degree of political equality in neighbouring countries could have influence on their
governance outcomes, which may in turn affect domestic quality of government. In fact,
the empirical evidence provided by Seldadyo et al. (2010) and Kelejian et al. (2013)
shows that governance in one country exhibits a positive and statistically significant
relationship with governance in neighbouring countries. In view of this, we should control
for the (weighted) average of the quality of government in neighbouring countries in order
to capture the possible existence of direct spatial spillovers in terms of governance. The
inclusion of this additional regressor means that our baseline model becomes a spatial
autoregressive (SAR) model, as it incorporates a spatial lag of the dependent variable
as a covariate. As is well known in the spatial econometrics literature, the presence of a
spatial lag of the dependent variable in the list of regressors is endogenous to the model,
since it implies simultaneous spatial interactions (Anselin, 1988). In order to overcome
this difficulty, we resort to the generalized spatial two stage least squares (GS2SLS)
estimator derived by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) and extended by Arraiz et al.
(2010) and Drucker et al. (2013), which implements a multistep estimation strategy
based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and IV to provide consistent
estimates of the coefficients of the model.11
11See Arraiz et al. (2010) or Drucker et al. (2013) for further technical details on the estimation
method.
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Table 7 shows the results obtained when the SAR model just described is estim-
ated by GS2SLS for the case of heteroskedasticity of unknown form in the error term.
Following our identification strategy, in all regressions we include the degree of political
equality in neighbouring countries as instrument for the domestic level of political equal-
ity. Our estimates reveal that government performance in one country is not affected
by governance in neighbouring countries, which contrasts with the findings obtained by
Seldadyo et al. (2010) and Kelejian et al. (2013). Turning our attention to the main
aim of the paper, the information provided by Table 7 shows that the coefficient of the
measure of political equality remains in all cases positive and statistically significant.
This confirms that political equality exerts a positive and significant impact on govern-
ment quality, which supports the first hypothesis proposed in section 2. Indeed, if we
compare the estimates in Table 7 with the earlier OLS regressions in Table 1, we observe
that the coefficient estimates of the measure of political equality are very similar in size.
At this point it is important to note that the presence of the quality of government
in neighbouring countries in the list of regressors complicates the interpretation of the
coefficient estimates in a SAR model. As shown by LeSage and Pace (2009, pp. 33-42),
in this type of model a change in a particular explanatory variable in country i has a
direct effect on the dependent variable in that country, but also an indirect effect on the
remaining countries. The total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effect. Table
8 shows these effects calculated from the SAR model with the full set of controls. The
results reveal that the total effects are clearly driven by the direct effects, whereas the
indirect effects are in all cases considerably smaller and non-significant. Accordingly, the
26
total effect of political equality on government quality is very similar to the coefficient
estimate in column 5 of Table 7.
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE
The results in Tables 7 and 8 may be sensitive to the method employed to construct
the instrument. In order to explore this issue, we now recalculate the instrument using
different cut-off values (2,000, 3,000, 4,000, 5,000, 6,000 and 7,000 kilometres) above
which spatial interactions between countries are assumed to be negligible. The results
of this robustness test are presented in Tables A3 and A4. As can be checked, the
observed impact of political equality on the quality of government holds in all cases.
A potential transmission channel: The role of education
In order to complement our previous findings, in this section we present an exploratory
analysis about why the degree of concentration of political power across income groups
should affect the quality of government. According to the theoretical framework in
section 2, our hypothesis is that education is a plausible transmission channel linking
political equality and governance. Therefore, we now aim to examine whether education
can mediate the positive reduced-form cross-country relationship found between political
equality and quality of government. To do so, we use a measure of education drawn
from the V-Dem dataset, which captures to what extent is high quality basic education
guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
This measure of education is particularly appropriate in our context because, unlike
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other possible alternatives, it takes explicitly into account the quality of education and
its role in promoting political development.
We begin our analysis by investigating the link between political equality and edu-
cation. The information provided by columns 1-4 of Table 9 reveals that countries with
a higher degree of political equality are characterized by a greater level of education of
the population, which is consistent with the various arguments laid down in section 2.
In view of these results, we now include in our baseline model the measure of education.
If education were a valid transmission channel, the inclusion of this additional control
should reduce the effect of political equality on the quality of government, in terms of
coefficient size and/or its statistical significance. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 present
the results of the analysis. As can be seen, there is a positive and statistically significant
association between education and governance, conditional on political equality and the
remaining covariates. Nevertheless, the inclusion of education in the list of controls af-
fects the observed relationship between political equality and government performance.
Our estimates in column 5 indicate that, once education is controlled for, the coeffi-
cient of the measure of political equality remains positive, but its effect on the quality
of government is only significant at the 10% level. At the same time, the quantitative
importance of political equality as a predictor of governance outcomes experiences a
decrease of 39% in comparison with the estimates in column 5 of Table 1. When we
treat the measure of political equality as endogenous in column 6 of Table 9, the decline
is even larger (52%) in comparison with the results in column 5 of Table 7. Indeed, in
this case the degree of political equality does not exert a statistically significant impact
on the quality of government.12
12This result is confirmed if we calculate the corresponding direct, indirect and total effects. See Table
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INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE
Consistently with the second hypothesis formulated in section 2, these findings reveal
the role of education as a transmission channel linking political equality and quality of
government. However, the exploratory nature of the analysis implies that the inform-
ation provided by Table 9 should be treated with some caution. In particular, it is
important to note that education may itself be potentially endogenous (Fortunato and
Panizza, 2015). Accordingly, in order to assess more conclusively the importance of our
hypothesized transmission channel, one should exploit an independent exogenous source
of variation for the measure of education, a task that we leave open for future research.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the relationship between political equality and quality
of government. Our hypothesis is that political equality fosters access to inclusive edu-
cation and ultimately promotes good governance. We empirically test this hypothesis
using data for 145 countries with different levels of economic development. In order to
overcome potential endogeneity problems, our identification strategy exploits the vari-
ation in political equality in geographically neighbouring countries by means of spatial
econometric techniques. The results reveal a positive and statistically significant effect
of political equality on the quality of government. This implies that countries where
the political power is more evenly distributed tend on average to have higher levels of
institutional quality, which is consistent with our theoretical framework. In fact, this
A5 for further details.
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result is not affected by the inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of con-
trols that may be correlated with both political equality and quality of government,
including the level of democracy and the degree of economic inequality. In fact, the
observed link between political equality and governance remains robust to alternative
measures of quality of government, estimation techniques, and other sensitivity checks.
Our estimates also show that education acts as a transmission channel linking political
equality and quality of government.
Nowadays there is a wide consensus on the importance of the quality of govern-
ment for economic growth and long-run development, which explains why governance
has figured prominently in the international development agenda over the last years.
Against this background, the results of the paper raise some potentially interesting im-
plications. Specifically, our research reveals that the degree of concentration of political
power across income groups is a strong predictor of the quality of government, thus un-
derlining the relevance of political equality in this context. This implies that, although
intervention strategies in this context cannot be based on a “one size fits all” framework,
policy-makers at the national level and international organizations concerned with the
promotion of good governance should not overlook how the political power is distributed
across income groups. In any case, increasing the degree of political equality may not be
an easy task, as it is likely that the political elites have incentives to oppose any reform
that threaten the status quo.
Additional extensions to our work are not difficult to conceive. Thus, the present
paper has documented the unconditional effect of political equality on the quality of
government. Nevertheless, the impact of the degree of concentration of political power
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across income groups on governance may be contingent on factors such as the level of
development or the quality of democracy. Further research should explore the empirical
relevance of these potential interaction effects in order to complete our results. Moreover,
the analysis in the paper has highlighted the importance of education as a mediating
variable between political equality and quality of government. Nevertheless, it would
be interesting to examine the possible existence of other transmission channels linking
the degree of concentration of political power and governance. Only by addressing these
issues we will be able to attain a fuller understanding of the nature of the relationship
between political equality and quality of government.
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Table 1: Political equality and quality of government: OLS regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality 0.202*** 0.132** 0.188*** 0.147*** 0.111***
(0.064) (0.053) (0.066) (0.044) (0.041)
Democracy 0.023 0.038*** 0.017 0.004 0.015*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.869 0.274 0.488 1.041 0.352
(0.993) (0.736) (0.999) (0.701) (0.664)
English legal origin -0.448 -0.269 -0.384 -0.243 -0.151
(0.405) (0.304) (0.402) (0.252) (0.233)
French legal origin -0.772* -0.405 -0.704 -0.292 -0.170
(0.464) (0.343) (0.459) (0.294) (0.274)
German legal origin -0.184 -0.088 -0.158 0.081 0.076
(0.361) (0.279) (0.355) (0.208) (0.205)
Socialist legal origin -1.535*** -0.837*** -1.438*** -0.442 -0.287
(0.442) (0.310) (0.438) (0.281) (0.265)
Former colony 0.414** 0.374** 0.333* 0.117 0.124
(0.177) (0.173) (0.189) (0.148) (0.160)
Protestant -0.522 -0.090 -0.327 0.317 0.462
(0.556) (0.387) (0.562) (0.333) (0.323)
Catholic 0.169 -0.084 0.217 -0.081 -0.121
(0.181) (0.180) (0.181) (0.171) (0.171)
Muslim -0.251 0.029 -0.210 0.001 0.121
(0.191) (0.164) (0.190) (0.164) (0.158)
Latitude 0.024*** 0.015** 0.021*** 0.011** 0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.095** -0.109*** -0.098***
(0.042) (0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.023)
Elevation 0.093 0.281** 0.080 0.144 0.232**
(0.141) (0.116) (0.137) (0.104) (0.096)
Roughness -0.863** -0.839** -0.822** -0.255 -0.396
(0.407) (0.323) (0.406) (0.320) (0.297)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.229 -0.060 -0.201 -0.079 -0.003
(0.259) (0.216) (0.241) (0.182) (0.165)
Ethn. polarization -0.166 -0.380* -0.138 -0.203 -0.300*
(0.256) (0.198) (0.263) (0.179) (0.165)
GDP per capita (log) 0.396*** 0.237***
(0.070) (0.057)




Constant 1.598** -2.279*** 1.569** -1.775*** -3.087***
(0.756) (0.785) (0.727) (0.535) (0.669)
R-squared 0.761 0.836 0.769 0.878 0.893
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality of government
described in section 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2: Robustness analysis: Influential countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Political equality 0.108*** 0.104** 0.131** 0.098** 0.118** 0.117*** 0.117**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.056) (0.045) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049)
Democracy 0.017** 0.014 0.015 0.014* 0.011 0.015* 0.031**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Economic inequality -0.459 -0.084 0.487 0.141 0.152 0.915 0.515
(0.592) (0.724) (0.747) (0.681) (0.688) (0.672) (0.744)
English legal origin -0.026 -0.089 -0.169 -0.186 -0.239 -0.104
(0.209) (0.301) (0.235) (0.170) (0.252) (0.225)
French legal origin -0.041 -0.141 -0.228 -0.210 -0.274 0.003 -0.089
(0.244) (0.331) (0.272) (0.181) (0.283) (0.123) (0.269)
German legal origin 0.116 0.096 0.025 -0.005 0.365 0.102
(0.195) (0.315) (0.204) (0.207) (0.288) (0.200)
Socialist legal origin -0.301 -0.290 -0.413 -0.404** -0.461* 0.023 -0.333
(0.253) (0.335) (0.255) (0.177) (0.271) (0.172) (0.268)
Former colony 0.192 0.141 0.151 0.116 0.204 0.081 0.121
(0.163) (0.158) (0.164) (0.161) (0.157) (0.156) (0.185)
Protestant 0.355 0.503 0.324 0.375 0.292 0.130 0.494
(0.310) (0.328) (0.323) (0.344) (0.326) (0.396) (0.310)
Catholic -0.222 -0.094 -0.145 -0.203 -0.079 -0.130 -0.123
(0.141) (0.162) (0.182) (0.174) (0.179) (0.178) (0.184)
Muslim -0.006 0.074 -0.044 0.064 -0.002 0.092 0.097
(0.141) (0.163) (0.174) (0.155) (0.160) (0.147) (0.177)
Latitude 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.105*** -0.107***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027)
Elevation 0.287*** 0.186** 0.230** 0.226** 0.222** 0.212** 0.284***
(0.089) (0.086) (0.110) (0.096) (0.094) (0.103) (0.108)
Roughness -0.528** -0.326 -0.397 -0.317 -0.412 -0.377 -0.563*
(0.220) (0.244) (0.294) (0.312) (0.279) (0.321) (0.305)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.035 0.004 -0.095 -0.051 -0.109 0.094 -0.106
(0.160) (0.161) (0.177) (0.167) (0.175) (0.177) (0.184)
Ethn. polarization -0.364** -0.239 -0.252 -0.320* -0.215 -0.362** -0.273
(0.161) (0.174) (0.178) (0.173) (0.184) (0.174) (0.179)
GDP per capita (log) 0.246*** 0.254*** 0.189*** 0.240*** 0.276*** 0.219*** 0.221***
(0.053) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.061) (0.069)
Natural resources -0.007* -0.009** -0.008* -0.007* -0.004 -0.007* -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Globalization 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Constant -2.711*** -3.037*** -2.668*** -2.943*** -2.941*** -3.141*** -2.866***
(0.635) (0.660) (0.692) (0.625) (0.699) (0.626) (0.692)
Omitted observations |DFBETA| None Lowest pol. Highest pol. Lowest qual. Highest qual. Dictator-
> 2/
√
n (robust reg.) equality equality of govern. of govern. ships
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.923 0.891 0.890 0.867 0.885 0.823 0.901
Observations 132 145 130 131 130 130 131
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality of government described in section 3. With the exception of
column (2), robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 3: Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of quality of government.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Quality of Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of
variable government accountability stability effectiveness quality law
(WGI)(a) (WGI) (WGI) (WGI) (WGI) (WGI)
Political equality 0.122*** 0.142*** 0.142** 0.104** 0.003 0.126***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.065) (0.040) (0.048) (0.045)
Democracy 0.022*** 0.078*** -0.004 0.011 0.034*** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Economic inequality 0.437 -0.391 1.608 0.169 0.449 0.266
(0.659) (0.677) (1.174) (0.638) (0.747) (0.767)
English legal origin -0.072 0.331* -0.160 -0.291 -0.141 0.010
(0.207) (0.174) (0.341) (0.227) (0.250) (0.252)
French legal origin -0.099 0.294 -0.207 -0.389 -0.114 -0.020
(0.235) (0.202) (0.371) (0.270) (0.286) (0.283)
German legal origin 0.156 0.438** 0.190 -0.056 0.033 0.284
(0.191) (0.171) (0.353) (0.191) (0.220) (0.222)
Socialist legal origin -0.124 0.216 0.188 -0.402 0.048 -0.166
(0.231) (0.202) (0.392) (0.260) (0.300) (0.283)
Former colony 0.154 0.213* 0.213 0.139 -0.028 0.103
(0.161) (0.126) (0.281) (0.148) (0.135) (0.174)
Protestant 0.507* 0.658*** 0.533 0.156 0.512 0.613*
(0.277) (0.217) (0.471) (0.316) (0.334) (0.344)
Catholic -0.022 0.056 0.298 -0.120 -0.147 -0.081
(0.143) (0.120) (0.199) (0.170) (0.166) (0.178)
Muslim 0.088 0.082 -0.037 0.117 0.226 0.093
(0.153) (0.151) (0.301) (0.157) (0.166) (0.169)
Latitude 0.010** 0.015*** 0.016** 0.003 0.000 0.009*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Surface (log) -0.102*** -0.035 -0.184*** -0.075*** -0.104*** -0.095***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026)
Elevation 0.158* -0.027 0.050 0.301*** 0.225*** 0.157
(0.090) (0.079) (0.140) (0.099) (0.082) (0.101)
Roughness -0.341 0.132 -0.589* -0.391 -0.476** -0.344
(0.270) (0.241) (0.355) (0.292) (0.229) (0.309)
Ethn. fractionalization 0.046 0.297** -0.010 0.109 0.052 -0.073
(0.156) (0.135) (0.290) (0.171) (0.166) (0.171)
Ethn. polarization -0.275* -0.360** -0.093 -0.377** -0.298* -0.260
(0.153) (0.151) (0.273) (0.169) (0.178) (0.200)
GDP per capita (log) 0.223*** 0.100** 0.288*** 0.318*** 0.167*** 0.245***
(0.055) (0.050) (0.087) (0.063) (0.059) (0.062)
Natural resources -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.007** -0.007* -0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Globalization 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant -2.903*** -2.756*** -2.316** -3.642*** -2.844*** -3.231***
(0.647) (0.585) (1.086) (0.576) (0.664) (0.727)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.894 0.916 0.685 0.899 0.880 0.874
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: (a) Average of the six WGI measures: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of quality of government (continu-
ation).
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent Control of Quality of Rule of Rule of Corruption
variable corruption government law law perception
(WGI) (ICRG)(b) (V-Dem) (Freedom (Transparency
House) International)
Political equality 0.213*** 0.021** 0.107*** 0.706*** 3.193***
(0.051) (0.010) (0.017) (0.243) (0.970)
Democracy -0.001 -0.000 0.012*** 0.313*** 0.013
(0.010) (0.002) (0.004) (0.058) (0.199)
Economic inequality 0.523 -0.217 0.564* -1.438 6.343
(0.869) (0.183) (0.314) (4.246) (17.693)
English legal origin -0.184 -0.020 0.160* 1.945* -7.044
(0.294) (0.044) (0.087) (1.166) (6.065)
French legal origin -0.156 -0.072 0.160 1.326 -6.721
(0.354) (0.052) (0.110) (1.318) (7.167)
German legal origin 0.045 0.006 0.183** 2.192** -2.100
(0.305) (0.048) (0.089) (1.084) (6.030)
Socialist legal origin -0.629* -0.190*** 0.191* 1.034 -14.716**
(0.332) (0.051) (0.104) (1.360) (6.738)
Former colony 0.282 0.074 0.054 0.116 4.140
(0.250) (0.051) (0.072) (0.853) (5.525)
Protestant 0.567 0.092 0.170 2.393 10.086
(0.419) (0.073) (0.130) (1.600) (8.229)
Catholic -0.136 0.036 0.016 0.455 -2.236
(0.240) (0.036) (0.053) (0.877) (4.751)
Muslim 0.048 -0.016 0.044 0.415 1.834
(0.209) (0.040) (0.065) (1.006) (4.042)
Latitude 0.018** 0.003** 0.004 0.086*** 0.309**
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.027) (0.136)
Surface (log) -0.119*** -0.016*** -0.022** -0.229 -2.418***
(0.032) (0.006) (0.011) (0.153) (0.608)
Elevation 0.245* 0.085*** 0.043 -0.166 5.559**
(0.143) (0.031) (0.046) (0.496) (2.659)
Roughness -0.375 -0.206** -0.089 0.513 -10.593
(0.435) (0.093) (0.110) (1.365) (8.087)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.101 -0.009 0.099 -0.255 -1.881
(0.231) (0.048) (0.081) (0.906) (4.207)
Ethn. polarization -0.262 -0.014 -0.166** -1.177 -4.276
(0.205) (0.048) (0.072) (0.934) (4.047)
GDP per capita (log) 0.219*** 0.030** 0.067*** 0.637* 4.419***
(0.081) (0.015) (0.023) (0.349) (1.455)
Natural resources -0.006 -0.001 -0.003** -0.031 -0.084
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.029) (0.096)
Globalization 0.022*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.052 0.506***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.034) (0.115)
Constant -2.629*** 0.188 -0.747*** -4.026 -6.883
(0.947) (0.180) (0.266) (3.754) (20.022)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.836 0.889 0.791 0.838 0.840
Observations 145 121 145 145 144
Notes: (b) Average of the ICRG measures of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Robustness analysis: Pooled OLS regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality 0.187*** 0.107*** 0.175*** 0.132*** 0.096***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
Democracy 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic inequality 0.740** 0.036 0.389 0.602*** -0.013
(0.314) (0.230) (0.323) (0.223) (0.215)
English legal origin -0.321*** -0.182** -0.278** -0.114* -0.073
(0.118) (0.083) (0.115) (0.068) (0.064)
French legal origin -0.618*** -0.277*** -0.568*** -0.175** -0.094
(0.132) (0.091) (0.128) (0.078) (0.072)
German legal origin -0.117 -0.036 -0.110 0.146** 0.106*
(0.110) (0.075) (0.107) (0.059) (0.057)
Socialist legal origin -1.480*** -0.742*** -1.417*** -0.450*** -0.336***
(0.135) (0.088) (0.132) (0.079) (0.073)
Former colony 0.433*** 0.347*** 0.377*** 0.164*** 0.166***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.058) (0.045) (0.048)
Protestant -0.404** 0.123 -0.289* 0.387*** 0.501***
(0.169) (0.104) (0.164) (0.092) (0.084)
Catholic 0.192*** -0.009 0.204*** -0.054 -0.075
(0.055) (0.047) (0.055) (0.049) (0.046)
Muslim -0.255*** 0.027 -0.238*** -0.028 0.068
(0.060) (0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.050)
Latitude 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Surface (log) -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.086***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Elevation 0.104** 0.261*** 0.107** 0.154*** 0.229***
(0.044) (0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.027)
Roughness -0.877*** -0.786*** -0.863*** -0.213** -0.380***
(0.128) (0.087) (0.128) (0.099) (0.085)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.365*** -0.162** -0.343*** -0.119** -0.071
(0.083) (0.063) (0.078) (0.058) (0.052)
Ethn. polarization -0.078 -0.228*** -0.072 -0.196*** -0.238***
(0.084) (0.064) (0.083) (0.062) (0.057)
GDP per capita (log) 0.469*** 0.269***
(0.019) (0.020)




Constant 1.301*** -3.087*** 1.300*** -2.018*** -3.391***
(0.233) (0.219) (0.227) (0.163) (0.197)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.779 0.864 0.784 0.883 0.899
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality of government
described in section 3. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *
Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Robustness analysis: Multiple imputation estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality 0.200*** 0.131** 0.187*** 0.145*** 0.111***
(0.064) (0.053) (0.066) (0.044) (0.041)
Democracy 0.023 0.038*** 0.017 0.004 0.015*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.776 0.248 0.433 0.930 0.313
(1.021) (0.794) (1.029) (0.706) (0.667)
English legal origin -0.438 -0.266 -0.377 -0.231 -0.147
(0.403) (0.304) (0.400) (0.251) (0.233)
French legal origin -0.762 -0.402 -0.698 -0.282 -0.166
(0.462) (0.343) (0.457) (0.294) (0.274)
German legal origin -0.179 -0.086 -0.155 0.086 0.078
(0.360) (0.279) (0.354) (0.208) (0.205)
Socialist legal origin -1.527*** -0.835*** -1.432*** -0.434 -0.284
(0.441) (0.310) (0.437) (0.281) (0.265)
Former colony 0.415** 0.374** 0.333* 0.118 0.124
(0.178) (0.173) (0.189) (0.147) (0.160)
Protestant -0.516 -0.086 -0.322 0.322 0.465
(0.556) (0.387) (0.561) (0.334) (0.323)
Catholic 0.166 -0.085 0.216 -0.085 -0.122
(0.182) (0.180) (0.181) (0.172) (0.171)
Muslim -0.255 0.028 -0.212 -0.005 0.120
(0.191) (0.165) (0.190) (0.164) (0.158)
Latitude 0.024*** 0.014** 0.021*** 0.011** 0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.094** -0.108*** -0.098***
(0.042) (0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.023)
Elevation 0.094 0.282** 0.081 0.145 0.233**
(0.141) (0.116) (0.137) (0.104) (0.096)
Roughness -0.855** -0.836** -0.818** -0.246 -0.394
(0.407) (0.323) (0.405) (0.319) (0.297)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.230 -0.062 -0.202 -0.080 -0.004
(0.259) (0.216) (0.240) (0.182) (0.165)
Ethn. polarization -0.162 -0.378* -0.135 -0.199 -0.298*
(0.255) (0.198) (0.262) (0.179) (0.165)
GDP per capita (log) 0.397*** 0.238***
(0.070) (0.058)




Constant 1.616** -2.278*** 1.578** -1.752*** -3.083***
(0.765) (0.786) (0.736) (0.536) (0.667)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: The estimation considers the underlying uncertainty in the inequality measures
introduced by the multiple imputation procedures used by Solt (2016) in order to reduce
the number of missing values in the SWIID data set. The dependent variable is in all
cases the measure of quality of government described in section 3. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, ***
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6: First stage regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality in 1.248*** 1.232*** 1.187*** 1.223*** 1.095***
neighbouring countries (0.303) (0.296) (0.327) (0.308) (0.328)
Democracy 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.061***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Economic inequality -3.268** -3.438** -3.441** -3.192** -3.968**
(1.495) (1.455) (1.509) (1.528) (1.575)
English legal origin -0.769 -0.659 -0.728 -0.712 -0.555
(0.464) (0.444) (0.468) (0.444) (0.454)
French legal origin -0.928* -0.723 -0.883* -0.808* -0.615
(0.500) (0.476) (0.504) (0.475) (0.486)
German legal origin -0.962** -0.886** -0.937** -0.890** -0.845**
(0.427) (0.407) (0.428) (0.411) (0.410)
Socialist legal origin -1.449*** -1.064** -1.389*** -1.185** -0.947*
(0.489) (0.466) (0.499) (0.480) (0.491)
Former colony -0.331 -0.337 -0.371 -0.394 -0.395
(0.270) (0.243) (0.273) (0.282) (0.247)
Protestant -0.418 -0.203 -0.307 -0.221 0.018
(0.501) (0.472) (0.523) (0.500) (0.507)
Catholic -0.103 -0.226 -0.073 -0.157 -0.164
(0.347) (0.336) (0.346) (0.337) (0.334)
Muslim -0.465 -0.316 -0.437 -0.401 -0.235
(0.376) (0.395) (0.375) (0.395) (0.387)
Latitude -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Surface (log) -0.016 -0.017 -0.008 -0.015 0.002
(0.049) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050)
Elevation 0.208 0.294 0.197 0.216 0.295
(0.193) (0.196) (0.198) (0.193) (0.204)
Roughness 0.260 0.269 0.266 0.392 0.201
(0.533) (0.524) (0.536) (0.533) (0.547)
Ethn. fractionalization 0.316 0.389 0.322 0.345 0.412
(0.324) (0.323) (0.326) (0.321) (0.331)
Ethn. polarization 0.055 -0.053 0.072 0.047 -0.046
(0.404) (0.416) (0.403) (0.400) (0.413)
GDP per capita (log) 0.192** 0.264**
(0.092) (0.120)




Constant 1.803* -0.150 1.807** 1.029 -0.369
(0.911) (1.147) (0.910) (1.048) (1.119)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic excluded instrument 16.95*** 17.37*** 13.19*** 15.76*** 11.13***
R-squared 0.496 0.513 0.497 0.501 0.520
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of political equality described in
section 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant
at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Political equality and quality of government: GS2SLS regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality 0.184** 0.109* 0.183** 0.149** 0.117**
(0.081) (0.062) (0.080) (0.061) (0.053)
Democracy 0.022* 0.037*** 0.017 0.005 0.015**
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Economic inequality 0.856 0.246 0.501 1.043 0.354
(0.925) (0.696) (0.926) (0.648) (0.619)
English legal origin -0.489 -0.312 -0.399 -0.237 -0.139
(0.384) (0.283) (0.379) (0.238) (0.217)
French legal origin -0.821* -0.456 -0.722* -0.284 -0.156
(0.435) (0.315) (0.428) (0.280) (0.256)
German legal origin -0.223 -0.131 -0.171 0.088 0.088
(0.333) (0.251) (0.330) (0.202) (0.196)
Socialist legal origin -1.575*** -0.878*** -1.454*** -0.435 -0.273
(0.414) (0.288) (0.411) (0.274) (0.250)
Former colony 0.411** 0.369** 0.335* 0.117 0.124
(0.163) (0.152) (0.174) (0.136) (0.146)
Protestant -0.608 -0.177 -0.362 0.330 0.486
(0.523) (0.358) (0.538) (0.320) (0.312)
Catholic 0.123 -0.135 0.201 -0.075 -0.110
(0.170) (0.162) (0.175) (0.156) (0.157)
Muslim -0.268 0.012 -0.217 0.004 0.127
(0.180) (0.152) (0.177) (0.155) (0.147)
Latitude 0.021*** 0.012** 0.020*** 0.012** 0.008*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.094** -0.109*** -0.099***
(0.039) (0.027) (0.040) (0.023) (0.021)
Elevation 0.108 0.299*** 0.085 0.142 0.228***
(0.128) (0.104) (0.127) (0.095) (0.088)
Roughness -0.813** -0.785*** -0.808** -0.261 -0.406
(0.376) (0.295) (0.370) (0.292) (0.270)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.210 -0.038 -0.196 -0.081 -0.007
(0.241) (0.198) (0.221) (0.164) (0.147)
Ethn. polarization -0.183 -0.400** -0.144 -0.201 -0.295**
(0.237) (0.181) (0.243) (0.164) (0.150)
GDP per capita (log) 0.400*** 0.237***
(0.063) (0.052)




Quality of government in 0.319 0.339 0.102 -0.046 -0.072
neighbouring countries (0.302) (0.232) (0.299) (0.206) (0.189)
Constant 1.639** -2.261*** 1.581** -1.787*** -3.100***
(0.703) (0.731) (0.676) (0.515) (0.610)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.762 0.836 0.769 0.878 0.893
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality of government described
in section 3. The estimation method is GS2SLS with heteroskedastic innovations of unknown
form in the disturbance process. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
52
Table 8: Direct, indirect and total effects.
Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects
Political equality 0.117** -0.008 0.109**
(0.053) (0.021) (0.046 )
Democracy 0.015** -0.001 0.014*
(0.007) (0.002) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.354 -0.024 0.331
(0.619) (0.075) (0.575)
English legal origin -0.139 0.009 -0.130
(0.217) (0.023) (0.211)
French legal origin -0.156 0.010 -0.145
(0.256) (0.026) (0.248)
German legal origin 0.088 -0.006 0.082
(0.196) (0.023) (0.178)
Socialist legal origin -0.273 0.018 -0.255
(0.250) (0.042) (0.253)
Former colony 0.124 -0.008 0.115
(0.146) (0.023) (0.136)
Protestant 0.486 -0.033 0.454 *
(0.312) (0.091) (0.269)
Catholic -0.110 0.007 -0.102
(0.157) (0.019) (0.151)
Muslim 0.127 -0.008 0.118
(0.147) (0.026) (0.132 )
Latitude 0.008* -0.001 0.008*
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Surface (log) -0.099*** 0.007 -0.092***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.026)
Elevation 0.228** -0.015 0.212**
(0.088) (0.037) (0.095)
Roughness -0.406 0.027 -0.379
(0.270) (0.072) (0.252)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.007 0.000 -0.007
(0.147) (0.010) (0.137)
Ethn. polarization -0.295** 0.020 -0.275**
(0.150) (0.048) (0.155)
GDP per capita (log) 0.237 *** -0.016 0.221 ***
(0.052) (0.039) (0.061)
Natural resources -0.007** 0.000 -0.007**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Globalization 0.029*** -0.002 0.027***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates
in column 5 of Table 7. The dependent variable is in all cases
the measure of quality of government described in section 3.
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level,
** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Political equality and quality of government: The role of education.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS GS2SLS OLS GS2SLS OLS GS2SLS
Dependent variable Education Education Education Education Quality of Quality of
government government
Political equality 0.530*** 0.341** 0.320*** 0.275** 0.074* 0.056
(0.106) (0.167) (0.103) (0.117) (0.044) (0.055)
Democracy 0.013 0.023 -0.000 0.005 0.015* 0.016**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.008) (0.007)
Economic inequality -1.818 -1.948 -2.575 -2.986** 0.651 0.607
(1.541) (1.547) (1.635) (1.480) (0.634) (0.579)
English legal origin -0.079 -0.032 -0.142 -0.155
(0.566) (0.499) (0.229) (0.210)
French legal origin -0.127 -0.052 -0.155 -0.170
(0.642) (0.576) (0.273) (0.252)
German legal origin 0.177 0.230 0.056 0.038
(0.561) (0.510) (0.217) (0.204)
Socialist legal origin -0.186 -0.094 -0.266 -0.285
(0.672) (0.629) (0.257) (0.241)
Former colony -0.030 -0.101 0.128 0.122
(0.309) (0.279) (0.158) (0.141)
Protestant -0.871 -0.641 0.563* 0.556*
(0.656) (0.634) (0.318) (0.303)
Catholic -0.876*** -0.813*** -0.019 -0.023
(0.298) (0.281) (0.168) (0.151)
Muslim -0.833** -0.815** 0.218 0.218
(0.404) (0.365) (0.159) (0.145)
Latitude 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
Surface (log) -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.082*** -0.081***
(0.052) (0.046) (0.023) (0.021)
Elevation 0.172 0.152 0.212** 0.217***
(0.175) (0.166) (0.093) (0.083)
Roughness -0.248 -0.313 -0.368 -0.360
(0.473) (0.454) (0.300) (0.275)
Ethn. fractionalization 0.033 0.047 -0.007 0.000
(0.372) (0.334) (0.153) (0.135)
Ethn. polarization -0.620 -0.600* -0.228 -0.227
(0.404) (0.361) (0.182) (0.166)
GDP per capita (log) 0.528*** 0.560*** 0.176*** 0.177***
(0.138) (0.123) (0.065) (0.059)
Natural resources -0.012 -0.014** -0.006 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Globalization -0.001 -0.002 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
Education in 0.570 -0.378 0.116*** 0.122***
neighbouring countries (0.409) (0.372) (0.044) (0.042)
Quality of government in 0.054
neighbouring countries (0.190)
Constant 1.857*** 1.274 -0.309 -0.159 -3.051*** -3.039***
(0.551) (0.783) (1.382) (1.218) (0.640) (0.582)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.588 0.756 0.900
Pseudo R-squared 0.572 0.757 0.900
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: In odd columns the estimation method is OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses, while in
even columns the estimation method is GS2SLS with heteroskedastic innovations of unknown form in the
disturbance process. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1%
level.
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APPENDIX (for online publication)
A1 Data
A1.1 Political equality
As pointed out in section 3, the V-Dem measure of political equality used in the paper
is based on the information provided by numerous country experts, who code one or
several countries according to expertise. Before being asked about how political power
is distributed across income groups, country experts receive the following instructions
(Coppedge et al., 2018a, p. 186):
This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which
members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to
the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies
between those who hold positions of power within the state (political
elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of polit-
ical power among identifiable groups within the population. What
does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power?
Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer
that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively par-
ticipate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society
organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able
to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f)
influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all
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these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the
picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response
should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power
into account.)
Country experts must then answer the following question (Coppedge et al., 2018a, p.
186):
Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic
position?
Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of eco-
nomic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and
wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the
difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are con-
cerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the
political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with
the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.
Responses:
0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Av-
erage and poorer people have almost no influence.
1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People
of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no
influence.
2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People
of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only
on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people
of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also
have a significant degree of political power.
4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose
economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less
equally distributed across economic groups.
As described in section 3, the ratings provided by country experts are aggregated
using a measurement model based on Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling
techniques, which produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a
standardized interval scale. See Coppedge et al. (2018b) for further details.
A1.2 Quality of government
The four WGI measures used to construct our main index of quality of government are
defined as follows (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 223):
• Government effectiveness: Measuring perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies.
• Regulatory quality: Measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
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private sector development.
• Rule of law: Measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
• Control of corruption: Measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
A1.3 Control variables
We now present the definitions and sources of the different control variables used through-
out the paper:
• Democracy: Democracy index ranging between -10 (full autocracy) and 10 (full
democracy). Source: Polity IV Project.
• Economic inequality: Gini index calculated using data on household disposable
(post-tax, post-transfer) income. Source: Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID).
• Legal origins: Set of dummy variables that identify the legal origin of the Company
Law or Commercial Code of a country. The four legal origins considered are: (i)
English Common Law, (ii) French Commercial Code, (iii) German legal origin,
and (iv) Socialist or Communist Laws. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
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• Former colony: Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country is a
former European colony, zero otherwise. Source: Own elaboration based on data
drawn from Nunn and Puga (2012).
• Protestant: Share of Protestants in the total population in the year 2000. Source:
Barro and McCleary (2003).
• Catholic: Share of Roman Catholics in the total population in the year 2000.
Source: Barro and McCleary (2003).
• Muslim: Share of Muslims in the total population in the year 2000. Source: Barro
and McCleary (2003).
• Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of a country’s approximate geodesic
centroid. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
• Surface: Natural log of a country’s total area, including areas under inland bodies
of water and some coastal waterways. Source: World Development Indicators
(World Bank).
• Elevation: Mean elevation of a country in kilometres above sea level, calculated
using geospatial data. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
• Terrain roughness: Degree of terrain roughness of a country, calculated using
geospatial data. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
• Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization that
captures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the population
belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. See Desmet et al. (2012) for further
details. Although Desmet et al. (2012) consider different levels of aggregation of
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linguistic groups in a country’s population (based on hierarchical linguistic trees),
the specific fractionalization measure used in our analysis is the one corresponding
to their most disaggregated level. Source: Desmet et al. (2012).
• Ethnolinguistic polarization: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization that quantifies
the extent to which the ethnolinguistic composition of a country’s population
resembles a perfectly polarized distribution, in which the national population is
composed of two groups of equal size. See Desmet et al. (2012) for further details.
Although Desmet et al. (2012) consider different levels of aggregation of linguistic
groups in a country’s population (based on hierarchical linguistic trees), the specific
polarization measure used in our analysis is the one corresponding to their most
disaggregated level. Source: Desmet et al. (2012).
• GDP per capita: Natural log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity
(PPP). Data are in constant 2011 international dollars. Source: World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank).
• Natural resources: Total natural resources rents expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
• Globalization: KOF globalization index. The index is constructed using different
variables that capture the economic, social and political dimensions of globaliza-
tion. See Dreher (2006) for further details. Source: Dreher (2006).
• Education: Measure which captures to what extent is high quality basic education
guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult
citizens. Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but
this varies slightly among countries. The method used to construct this variable
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is very similar to that described in section 3 in relation to the measure of political
equality. See Coppedge et al. (2018a) for further details. Source: V-Dem dataset.
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Table A1: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quality of government -0.051 0.968 -1.511 2.037
Political equality 0.498 0.974 -2.237 2.642
Democracy 4.489 5.732 -10.000 10.000
Economic inequality 0.394 0.082 0.238 0.613
English legal origin 0.269 0.445 0.000 1.000
French legal origin 0.462 0.500 0.000 1.000
German legal origin 0.034 0.183 0.000 1.000
Socialist legal origin 0.207 0.406 0.000 1.000
Former colony 0.655 0.477 0.000 1.000
Protestant 0.115 0.179 0.000 0.897
Catholic 0.294 0.334 0.000 0.943
Muslim 0.221 0.332 0.000 0.991
Latitude 26.496 17.497 1.000 64.000
Surface (log) 12.144 1.835 6.550 16.654
Elevation 0.547 0.496 0.024 2.674
Roughness 0.200 0.185 0.013 1.242
Ethn. fractionalization 0.476 0.306 0.000 0.990
Ethn. polarization 0.457 0.250 0.000 0.958
GDP per capita (log) 9.004 1.256 6.337 11.691
Natural resources 9.379 12.324 0.000 50.865
Globalization 58.238 17.596 23.759 91.973
Education 0.571 1.416 -2.224 3.361
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Table A2: First stage regressions: QML estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political equality in 0.646*** 0.648*** 0.614*** 0.639*** 0.586***
neighbouring countries (0.187) (0.186) (0.197) (0.189) (0.202)
Economic inequality -3.436*** -3.603*** -3.679*** -3.350** -4.222***
(1.309) (1.288) (1.325) (1.303) (1.326)
Democracy 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.063***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
English legal origin -0.702 -0.592 -0.647 -0.644 -0.475
(0.582) (0.573) (0.582) (0.579) (0.571)
French legal origin -0.849 -0.643 -0.789 -0.723 -0.523
(0.635) (0.629) (0.635) (0.637) (0.628)
German legal origin -0.886 -0.811 -0.856 -0.811 -0.772
(0.611) (0.601) (0.610) (0.610) (0.597)
Socialist legal origin -1.394** -1.006 -1.310** -1.115* -0.866
(0.613) (0.624) (0.616) (0.642) (0.635)
Former colony -0.376 -0.381 -0.431 -0.442 -0.446
(0.300) (0.294) (0.303) (0.301) (0.298)
Protestant -0.231 -0.018 -0.083 -0.028 0.225
(0.614) (0.609) (0.627) (0.627) (0.625)
Catholic -0.023 -0.150 0.015 -0.083 -0.088
(0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.312) (0.309)
Muslim -0.401 -0.253 -0.366 -0.336 -0.163
(0.307) (0.308) (0.308) (0.309) (0.309)
Latitude 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Surface (log) -0.023 -0.024 -0.011 -0.022 0.001
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044)
Elevation 0.166 0.255 0.154 0.176 0.262
(0.163) (0.164) (0.162) (0.162) (0.164)
Roughness 0.128 0.141 0.150 0.271 0.085
(0.460) (0.452) (0.459) (0.469) (0.464)
Ethn. fractionalization 0.255 0.332 0.270 0.288 0.371
(0.311) (0.307) (0.310) (0.309) (0.305)
Ethn. polarization 0.109 -0.002 0.130 0.098 -0.002
(0.335) (0.332) (0.334) (0.333) (0.330)
GDP per capita (log) 0.194** 0.281**
(0.084) (0.112)




Constant 2.142** 0.153 2.115** 1.309 -0.180
(0.922) (1.247) (0.921) (1.097) (1.258)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.479 0.500 0.485 0.484 0.515
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: Quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates. The dependent variable is in all
cases the measure of political equality described in section 3. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant
at the 1% level.
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Table A3: Robustness analysis: Alternative definitions of the instrument.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cut-off 3,000 km. 4,000 km. 5,000 km. 6,000 km. 7,000 km.
Political equality 0.092* 0.113** 0.121** 0.116** 0.138**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057)
Democracy 0.016** 0.015** 0.014* 0.015* 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.259 0.352 0.380 0.363 0.438
(0.606) (0.614) (0.606) (0.615) (0.621)
English legal origin -0.143 -0.146 -0.136 -0.145 -0.127
(0.212) (0.222) (0.215) (0.213) (0.215)
French legal origin -0.160 -0.164 -0.153 -0.162 -0.143
(0.250) (0.260) (0.252) (0.251) (0.252)
German legal origin 0.072 0.080 0.089 0.082 0.101
(0.192) (0.196) (0.191) (0.191) (0.193)
Socialist legal origin -0.297 -0.283 -0.273 -0.280 -0.255
(0.243) (0.249) (0.245) (0.245) (0.248)
Former colony 0.117 0.126 0.132 0.127 0.136
(0.149) (0.146) (0.147) (0.148) (0.148)
Protestant 0.491* 0.468 0.479 0.470 0.477
(0.298) (0.311) (0.306) (0.301) (0.308)
Catholic -0.111 -0.119 -0.112 -0.117 -0.111
(0.159) (0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.158)
Muslim 0.116 0.121 0.128 0.125 0.130
(0.142) (0.143) (0.149) (0.151) (0.151)
Latitude 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Elevation 0.232** 0.231*** 0.226** 0.229*** 0.225**
(0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.087) (0.088)
Roughness -0.405 -0.398 -0.401 -0.398 -0.400
(0.266) (0.269) (0.270) (0.272) (0.272)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.011
(0.153) (0.150) (0.148) (0.149) (0.147)
Ethn. polarization -0.289* -0.298** -0.300** -0.299** -0.300**
(0.151) (0.150) (0.148) (0.148) (0.147)
GDP per capita (log) 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.229***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Natural resources -0.007** -0.007* -0.007** -0.007** -0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Globalization 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
QoG in neighb. Countries -0.044 -0.010 -0.037 -0.018 -0.042
(0.131) (0.150) (0.163) (0.172) (0.177)
Constant -3.114*** -3.092*** -3.097*** -3.090*** -3.097***
(0.621) (0.620) (0.610) (0.608) (0.613)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality of government described
in section 3. The estimation method is GS2SLS with heteroskedastic innovations of unknown
form in the disturbance process. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level,
** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table A4: Direct, indirect and total effects for different definitions of the instrument.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cut-off 3,000 km. Cut-off 4,000 km. Cut-off 5,000 km.
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Political equality 0.092*** -0.004 0.088** 0.113** -0.001 0.111** 0.121*** -0.004 0.117***
(0.050) (0.012) (0.045) (0.047) (0.017) (0.046) (0.047) (0.020) (0.044)
Democracy 0.016*** -0.001 0.016** 0.015* 0.000 0.015* 0.014* -0.001 0.014*
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.260 -0.011 0.249 0.352 -0.004 0.348 0.380 -0.014 0.366
(0.655) (0.044) (0.626) (0.652) (0.054) (0.650) (0.650) (0.064) (0.631)
English legal origin -0.143 0.006 -0.137 -0.146 0.001 -0.144 -0.136 0.005 -0.131
(0.272) (0.019) (0.264) (0.278) (0.022) (0.282) (0.272) (0.022) (0.268)
French legal origin -0.160 0.007 -0.154 -0.164 0.002 -0.162 -0.153 0.005 -0.148
(0.299) (0.021) (0.291) (0.305) (0.024) (0.310) (0.299) (0.024) (0.294)
German legal origin 0.072 -0.003 0.069 0.080 -0.001 0.079 0.089 -0.003 0.086
(0.282) (0.016) (0.269) (0.285) (0.013) (0.280) (0.282) (0.018) (0.270)
Socialist legal origin -0.297 0.012 -0.285 -0.283 0.003 -0.281 -0.273 0.010 -0.263
(0.299) (0.038) (0.292) (0.302) (0.043) (0.310) (0.300) (0.043) (0.298)
Former colony 0.117 -0.005 0.112 0.126 -0.001 0.124 0.132 -0.005 0.127
(0.142) (0.016) (0.135) (0.142) (0.019) (0.139) (0.142) (0.022) (0.135)
Protestant 0.491 -0.021 0.470 * 0.468 -0.005 0.463 0.480 -0.017 0.462
(0.295) (0.064) (0.278) (0.303) (0.072) (0.288) (0.305) (0.080) (0.280)
Catholic -0.111 0.005 -0.107 -0.119 0.001 -0.118 -0.112 0.004 -0.108
(0.147) (0.014) (0.144) (0.146) (0.018) (0.150) (0.149) (0.017) (0.149)
Muslim 0.116 -0.005 0.112 0.121 -0.001 0.120 0.128 -0.005 0.123
(0.144) (0.015) (0.140) (0.144) (0.019) (0.143) (0.147) (0.022) (0.139)
Latitude 0.008* 0.000 0.008** 0.008* 0.000 0.008* 0.008* 0.000 0.008*
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Surface (log) -0.098*** 0.004 -0.094*** -0.098*** 0.001 -0.097*** -0.098*** 0.004 -0.095***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) (0.020) (0.015) (0.025)
Elevation 0.232*** -0.010 0.222** 0.231*** -0.002 0.229** 0.226*** -0.008 0.218**
(0.079) (0.028) (0.086) (0.078) (0.035) (0.090) (0.079) (0.035) (0.091)
Roughness -0.405* 0.017 -0.388* -0.398* 0.004 -0.394* -0.401* 0.014 -0.387*
(0.217) (0.052) (0.209) (0.218) (0.061) (0.216) (0.217) (0.064) (0.212)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.005
(0.151) (0.007) (0.144) (0.146) (0.002) (0.144) (0.143) (0.005) (0.138)
Ethn. polarization -0.289* 0.012 -0.277* -0.298* 0.003 -0.295 * -0.300* 0.011 -0.289*
(0.156) (0.035) (0.160) (0.155) (0.045) (0.164) (0.154) (0.047) (0.156)
GDP per capita (log) 0.241*** -0.010 0.231*** 0.237*** -0.002 0.235*** 0.234*** -0.008 0.226***
(0.055) (0.029) (0.065) (0.054) (0.036) (0.066) (0.054) (0.037) (0.066)
Natural resources -0.007** 0.000 -0.007** -0.007** 0.000 -0.007* -0.007** 0.000 -0.007*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Globalization 0.029*** -0.001 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.029*** -0.001 0.028***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in Table A3. The dependent variable is in all cases the measure of quality
of government described in section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, ***
significant at the 1% level.
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Table A4: Direct, indirect and total effects for different definitions of the instrument
(continuation).
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Cut-off 6,000 km. Cut-off 7,000 km.
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Political equality 0.116** -0.002 0.114** 0.138*** -0.006 0.132***
(0.047) (0.020) (0.045) (0.047) (0.024) (0.045)
Democracy 0.015* 0.000 0.014* 0.013* -0.001 0.013
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.363 -0.007 0.357 0.438 -0.018 0.421
(0.652) (0.062) (0.647) (0.656) (0.076) (0.644)
English legal origin -0.145 0.003 -0.142 -0.127 0.005 -0.122
(0.271) (0.024) (0.272) (0.275) (0.022) (0.270)
French legal origin -0.162 0.003 -0.159 -0.143 0.006 -0.137
(0.298) (0.027) (0.300) (0.303) (0.024) (0.297)
German legal origin 0.082 -0.001 0.080 0.101 -0.004 0.097
(0.281) (0.015) (0.275) (0.283) (0.022) (0.270)
Socialist legal origin -0.280 0.005 -0.275 -0.255 0.010 -0.245
(0.301) (0.047) (0.305) (0.304) (0.043) (0.304)
Former colony 0.127 -0.002 0.125 0.136 -0.005 0.131
(0.141) (0.022) (0.138) (0.141) (0.024) (0.137)
Protestant 0.470 -0.008 0.462 0.477 -0.019 0.458
(0.305) (0.082) (0.285) (0.313) (0.087) (0.281)
Catholic -0.117 0.002 -0.115 -0.111 0.004 -0.107
(0.150) (0.019) (0.154) (0.150) (0.018) (0.151)
Muslim 0.125 -0.002 0.123 0.130 -0.005 0.125
(0.148) (0.022) (0.142) (0.148) (0.024) (0.139)
Latitude 0.008** 0.000 0.008 0.008* 0.000 0.008**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Surface (log) -0.098*** 0.002 -0.097*** -0.098*** 0.004 -0.095***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025)
Elevation 0.229*** -0.004 0.225** 0.225* -0.009 0.216**
(0.078) (0.039) (0.093) (0.077) (0.038) (0.087)
Roughness -0.398* 0.007 -0.391* -0.400 0.016 -0.384*
(0.217) (0.068) (0.217) (0.217) (0.070) (0.213)
Ethn. fractionalization -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 0.000 -0.010
(0.143) (0.003) (0.140) (0.143) (0.006) (0.137)
Ethn. polarization -0.299* 0.005 -0.294* -0.300* 0.012 -0.288*
(0.154) (0.051) (0.160) (0.154) (0.051) (0.158)
GDP per capita (log) 0.236*** -0.004 0.231*** 0.229*** -0.009 0.220***
(0.054) (0.040) (0.070) (0.054) (0.039) (0.067)
Natural resources -0.007* 0.000 -0.007* -0.007* 0.000 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Globalization 0.029*** -0.001 0.028*** 0.029*** -0.001 0.028***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in Table A3. The dependent variable
is in all cases the measure of quality of government described in section 3. Standard errors in
parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1%
level.
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Table A5: Direct, indirect and total effects when education is controlled for.
Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects
Political equality 0.056 0.003 0.059
(0.055) (0.010) (0.053)
Education 0.122*** 0.007 0.129**
(0.042) (0.027) (0.058)
Democracy 0.016** 0.001 0.017**
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Economic inequality 0.607 0.034 0.641
(0.579) (0.130) (0.614)
English legal origin -0.155 -0.009 -0.164
(0.210) (0.038) (0.233)
French legal origin -0.170 -0.010 -0.180
(0.252) (0.042) (0.279)
German legal origin 0.038 0.002 0.040
(0.204) (0.011) (0.212)
Socialist legal origin -0.285 -0.016 -0.301
(0.241) (0.066) (0.282)
Former colony 0.122 0.007 0.129
(0.141) (0.027) (0.150)
Protestant 0.556 0.031 0.588 **
(0.303) (0.112) (0.298)
Catholic -0.023 -0.001 -0.024
(0.151) (0.010) (0.160)
Muslim 0.218 0.012 0.230
(0.145) (0.044) (0.146)
Latitude 0.007 0.000 0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Surface (log) -0.081*** -0.005 -0.086***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.026)
Elevation 0.217*** 0.012 0.229**
(0.084) (0.047) (0.104)
Roughness -0.360 -0.020 -0.380
(0.275) (0.075) (0.287)
Ethn. fractionalization 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.135) (0.008) (0.143)
Ethn. polarization -0.227 -0.013 -0.240
(0.166) (0.048) (0.180)
GDP per capita (log) 0.177*** 0.010 0.187***
(0.059) (0.037) (0.064)
Natural resources -0.005 0.000 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Globalization 0.029*** 0.002 0.030***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates
in column 6 of Table 9. The dependent variable is in all cases
the measure of quality of government described in section 3.
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1%
level.
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